

**NEWSLETTER 2018-25****CALENDAR:****Departmental Seminar**

Koen Schoors (Ghent University):
Independent Media and Elections

Monday, November 5
16:30–18:00
H26

IOS Seminar

Martin Guzi (Masaryk University, Brno):
Driven by history: The Czech presidential elections

Tuesday, November 6
13:30–15:00
WiOS 109 (Landshuter Str. 4)

Lunch Seminar

Martin Hackmann (University of California, Los Angeles):
Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long Term Care

Wednesday, November 7
12:00–13:30
VG 2.35

Economic and Social History Seminar

Fabian Standl (München):
Der sozioökonomische Impact von Virus-Grippe-Pandemien am Beispiel der Russischen Grippe 1889-1892 und der Spanischen Grippe 1918-1920/21 in Deutschland und der Schweiz

Wednesday, November 7
18:00–20:15
VG 1.30

ABSTRACTS:**Departmental Seminar**

Koen Schoors

(joint work with Ruben Enikolopov, Michael Rochlitz and Nikita Zakharov)

Independent Media and Elections

Abstract: How does access to independent media affect voting behavior in an environment where media are largely captured by the state? To answer this question, we conduct two parallel randomized controlled experiments during the September 2016 Russian parliamentary elections. In a first experiment, we randomly distribute free access to the independent Russian online TV channel TV Rain during the first wave of an individual survey conducted 2 weeks before the elections. The second post-election wave of the individual survey reveals that treated respondents are about less likely to participate in the elections and less likely to vote for the government party United Russia. Subjects strongly in favor of the incumbent government before the election respond to the treatment with increased support for United Russia, suggesting the presence of a polarization effect. In a second city-level experiment, we offer free access to TV Rain in 20 out of 42 otherwise comparable mid-size Russian cities, 3 weeks before the same election. In 15 of the 20 treatment cities, we complement the offer with an advertisement campaign for TV Rain on social media. Our social media treatment leads to a clear increase in TV Rain audience and though this to a sizable increase in votes for the opposition, as well as to a clear decrease in votes for United Russia. In voting districts with high initial support for the government though, the treatment further increases the votes for United Russia, again providing evidence for a polarization effect of access to free media.

IOS Seminar

Martin Guzi

Driven by history: The Czech presidential elections

Abstract: We use data from public voting in the Czech presidential elections to show the connection between historical legacies and voting behavior. The issue of the German expulsion and Beneš decrees was raised before the second round of presidential campaign against Karel Schwarzenberg who eventually lost the elections. The analysis of voting behavior is based on results from two rounds of presidential elections organized within 14 days in 2013. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in voting behavior in former-Czech and former-German areas, with latter being affected by the Czechoslovakia's postwar expulsion of the German population. We hypothesize that the discussion about the validity of Beneš decrees raised concerns about the return of property to original owners only in areas affected by the postwar expulsion and resettlement process. The preliminary results confirm the increase in voter turnout in the second round of election in former-German settlements. We further illustrate the increasing support for a winning candidate (Miloš Zeman) in these settlements and discuss the potential mechanism. By measuring the sensitivity of voting behavior to historical events we bring attention to factors that have impact on voters' decisions.

Lunch Seminar

Martin Hackmann

(joint work with R. Vincent Pohl)

Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long Term Care

Abstract: We study how patient and provider incentives affect the mode and cost of long term care. Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields four main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable residents who pay out-of-pocket. Third, longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries do not improve health outcomes on average, pointing to annual overspending of \$0.9bn. Fourth, transitioning from per-diem to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective than increasing resident cost-sharing in shortening Medicaid stays.

Economic and Social History Seminar

Fabian Standl

Der sozioökonomische Impact von Virus-Grippe-Pandemien am Beispiel der Russischen Grippe 1889-1892 und der Spanischen Grippe 1918-1920/21 in Deutschland und der Schweiz

Abstract: Die Russische Grippe und die Spanische Grippe sind die beiden bisher tödlichsten Virus-Grippe-Pandemien in der Geschichte. Die Letalitäts- und Morbiditätsraten sind weithin bekannt, die Frage aber, welche sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen die Pandemien verursachten, wurde bisher nur in geringem Maße untersucht. Der Vortrag stützt sich auf Erkenntnisse aus den statistischen Jahrbüchern der beiden Staaten und erläutert, welche Auswirkungen in Hinsicht auf Demographie, Gesundheit und Volkswirtschaft messbar sind.

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