

Ask Lössch

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Abstract: August Lössch is the author of “The Economics of Location” (1940), considered a pioneering contribution to regional science at the time. This short note examines the notion that Lössch may have contributed to Nazi Germany’s genocidal spatial planning – and rejects it. Had Lössch contributed to Nazi spatial planning, then Lössch’s ideas would have to be in it. Yet they are not in it, as this note explains. And so Lössch did not contribute to Nazi spatial planning. However, Nazi spatial planning did take its toll on Lössch’s work. Lössch (1944) added a footnote that references Nazi spatial journals’ malign planning. – Ultimately I suggest complementing a biographical approach to Lössch with a textual one. Lössch should also speak, through his work (i.e. Lössch (1940, 1944, 1954)), for himself.

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1 Motivation

August Lösch (1906-1945) was a German spatial economist, and also the author of “The Economics of Location” (1st ed. in 1940, 2nd ed. in 1944, English translation in 1954). Until long after the time of publication this book was considered a pioneering contribution to the economics of location and space. Lösch twice was a Rockefeller scholar in the US. Then Lösch was with the Kiel Institute of World Economics for most of his brief professional life, and for all of World War II. Three weeks into peace August Lösch died, of scarlet fever.

Lösch has been well known ever since. His hexagonal market areas can be found in many introductory texts on regional and urban economics. Joseph Schumpeter and Wolfgang Stolper (Samuelson’s co-author on the Stolper-Samuelson-theorem) praised his academic contributions and personal integrity; both knew him well from joint years at Bonn University. Moreover, three important and relevant facts of his life continue to stand: First, Lösch never was a member of the Nazi party, nor of any of its various affiliates. Second, Lösch never applied for the professorship he had formally qualified for. Finally, and to the best of this author’s knowledge, no antisemitic quote can be linked to August Lösch.

Take (2019, 2023) reviews Lösch’s published and unpublished work, correspondence and even travels. An important, fuller picture emerges of the rare niche Lösch withdrew into. Take (2023) acknowledges that Lösch “was opposed to central aspects of the fascist ideology”. But Take (2023) also convincingly shows that Lösch was able to keep his distance to the Nazi state (and avoid conscription) only by providing that state with economic expertise (e.g. on Allied industrial capacity). It is hard to disagree with Take that Lösch’s studies informed the Wehrmacht’s war effort. Through his work, Lösch helped prolong the misery of the millions suffering under Nazi rule.

But Take (2019, 406) also takes his assessment further, arguing that when Christaller contributed to Nazi Germany’s “Ostraumplanung”, he was informed by his interaction with Lösch. Central to that “Ostraumplanung” is the “Generalplan Ost” (Meyer (1942)) commissioned by Heinrich Himmler (head executor of the Holocaust) and authored by Konrad Meyer (head of “Reichskommissariat”, one of Himmler’s many offices).² „Generalplan Ost“ set out a Germanic future for almost all Eastern European territory occupied by June 1942 (and beyond). By insisting on future population figures that oddly fell dramatically short of those before the war, “Generalplan Ost” implicitly assumed the expulsion and part-murder of millions (e.g. Tooze (2006)). “Generalplan Ost” projected the ongoing murder of the European Jewry to large parts of the non-Jewish population of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union – and even all of Eastern Europe.

The Wehrmacht’s retreat and eventual defeat may appear to have stopped „Generalplan Ost“ in its tracks. Yet in fact the expulsion and destruction it set

²Wikipedia translates “Generalplan Ost” into “Master Plan for the East”.

out were fully underway in mid-1942 (Aly/Heim (2004)). Leningrad was starved by the Wehrmacht's siege, as were many other Soviet cities; over 2 million Soviet prisoners of war had already died in Wehrmacht captivity; 2 million Polish and Soviet civilians had been deported into Nazi Germany, to work as forced laborers (a number that rises up to almost 4 million in 1944 (Spoerer/Fleischhacker (2002))); more than 100,000 inhabitants of Poland's Zamość region were driven off their land, and worse.

But did Lössch inform or advise "Generalplan Ost" and, by extension, the crimes committed in its course? This note disagrees. Lössch's spatial economic insights are no contribution to genocide. This note disagrees for a reason. If Lössch's spatial economic insights had informed "Generalplan Ost", or if Lössch had advised it, or if Lössch had only even been read and absorbed by its authors, then his ideas would have to be in it. But the "Generalplan Ost" does not read like *anything* in Lössch (1940)'s "Economics of Location" (which precedes it). The textual evidence is very clearly not there. By contraposition, Lössch's spatial insights have not informed "Generalplan Ost". Nor can Lössch have advised it.

"Generalplan Ost" does not compromise Lössch. In other ways, however, Lössch's life and work in the "Third Reich" *does* compromise him. Here this note concurs with both Kegler (2015) and Take (2023). Lössch contributed to Germany's war effort (see above). And Lössch referenced Nazi spatial planning in his work at least once. Lössch was drawn to the opportunity of a second edition of his book even when that meant adding a footnote that referenced publications by (i) the authors of the "Generalplan Ost" in Nazi planning journals which, (ii) in the veiled language of the Nazi state, (iii) condoned expulsion and worse.

This note is short. First is a summary of key features of "Generalplan Ost" (Section 2). These we contrast with Lössch's "Economics of Location". We address the salient issue of whether Lössch has informed, or even contributed to, that plan (Section 3). We then conversely address the issue of whether Nazi planning may in turn have compromised Lössch's work (Section 4). At last we suggest that reading Lössch (1940, 1944, 1954) may tell us as much about Lössch as, or even more than, his diary, his correspondence or his unpublished work do (Section 5). Lössch did not live to explain himself. But he left us, even by today's standards, an often still modern book well able to speak up for him.

2 Nazi Spatial Planning

There are different versions to "Generalplan Ost", and they are not all preserved. The version we focus on here first (henceforth GPO) dates from May/June 1942. It was officially authored by Konrad Meyer, a Nazi party and SS member promoted to professor for "agricultural policy" at Humboldt University in Berlin. GPO was recovered only after the war, after long thought to have been

lost (e.g. Heiber (1958)).³ GPO itself was secret.⁴ But GPO's secrecy is in odd contrast to how GPO's probable team of authors (and the larger network of spatial planners they were part of) set out Nazi planning for Eastern Europe in plain view of the public (Aly/Heim (2004, 411)) – if only in more guarded language. Two key publication outlets can easily be located in many German university libraries' holdings to this day. Today's holdings give a rough idea of how widely available those publications were among planners, geographers, or agricultural theorists back then.⁵

GPO's content and agenda are both appalling and mad. For this reason we limit our discussion of GPO to how it might reflect Lössch's ideas. There are three parts to GPO. Parts A and B set out GPO's agrarian, administrative and fiscal provisions for the occupied territories. These parts purport to discuss "spatial organization" and "cost sharing and finances". But of course, in largely ignoring the millions of people living in those territories historically, they really deal in theft of land, robbery of property, exploitation of labor, and ultimately murder. Part C sets out various time schedules for all of this.

More specifically, part A is about land (not capital), emphasizes agriculture (over industry and cities), and calls for assigning all ownership of land to the SS (instead of the state). Settlers deemed "Germanic enough" by the SS are to be encouraged – or might even be commandeered – to settle into "fiefs". Such fiefs recall medieval European feudal society, where overlords retained ownership of the land while their vassals were allowed to work that land in return for either payments or loyalty and support. So part A essentially envisions (i) Germanic (ii) farming-fiefs (iii) overseeing slave-laborers (iv) along with the SS.

Part B spells out the fiscal details of the looting. Part B first suggests assigning all fiscal authority to the SS. Part B next details various investment into agricultural capital, planting, forestation, highway and railway construction, electricity, water, and housing. This breakdown mirrors Part A's focus on agrarian activity; we barely see any planned investment into industry. Part B projects the man-hours involved, indicates the financial costs, and advocates new taxes and raising debt. Part B essentially outlines an (i) SS-controlled distribution of (ii) the surplus (iii) expected from large public investment into agriculture.⁶

³GPO's original has been digitized by Germany's Federal Archives, i.e. the *Bundesarchiv* in Berlin. This digitized version is accessible online here. (One simply needs to click *Digitalisat Anzeigen* and (not to forget!) to allow pop-ups with the browser. No English translation appears to exist to date but of course any translating machine may help here.) GPO is also reprinted in Madajczyk (1994), Document No. 23. Madajczyk also provides subsequent SS documents building on GPO, and SS correspondence surrounding it.

⁴For instance, Madajczyk (1994, Document No. 56) gives an example of an executive order mandating the secrecy of all maps produced for a later version of GPO.

⁵These two journals are the spatial planning and economic geography outlet *Raumforschung und Raumordnung* (RuR henceforth) and the pseudo-scientific, folk-centered *Neues Bauerntum* (NB for short, edited by the same Konrad Meyer who authored GPO). The journal data base ZDB identifies virtually hundreds of German language (university and other) libraries holding, to this day, at least some of the 1939-1945 volumes of RuR and some of the 1939-1944 volumes of NB. Most of these libraries, or their predecessors, would have been open to the general public in the early forties. Those holdings provide a lower bound on how widely those journals circulated among German speaking academics during Nazi rule.

⁶Madajczyk (1994)'s collection of later versions of GPO, and of some of the correspondence tied to them, provides a view of an ever-shifting discussion of which territories to include, how

Sidestepping GPO's immorality only for a moment, here are three core inconsistencies: (i) First, by May/June 1942 the plan had a very limited basis in reality.⁷ By mid-1942 the Wehrmacht had lost the Battle of Moscow; worse, the US had entered the war. Germany's war was not only not won yet; it began to look like it could also be lost. (ii) Ironically, second, the plan reversed all previous Nazi theory on the relationship between land and people. Nazi propaganda had always lamented Germany's scarcity of land. When the land finally seemed there (if one was prepared to ignore (i)), now there was a scarcity of Germans (Heiber (1958)). Tyrolians, Alsatians, but also Dutch, Danish settlers would eventually, willing or not, have to be recruited, too. And then (iii) the plan's agrarian utopia made little to no economic sense, even by Nazi Germany's own, debased, standards.

Germany could have sourced food easily from its much closer, and more productive, Western neighbors. Instead, it starved them of all oil and means of spatial distribution (Tooze (2006)). Why would food need to increase by adding land, rather than by adding machinery, fertilizers, etc. – as the US example already forcefully began to demonstrate (e.g. O'Brian and Prados de la Escosura (1992))? And why would cities in conquered territories have to shrink if urban outputs in machinery and armament were so obviously essential to Germany's military success? Why was population density to decrease if the amelioration of all that land called for its increase? And in any case, who was the huge expected eventual food surplus, from Ukraine or elsewhere, for? Suppose it was meant for consumers in Germany. At what cost, and how, would it need be transported? Would those agricultural imports not then depress the incomes of the very farmers (in Bavaria, Saxony, etc) the Nazis held up as Germanic ideal?

3 An Idea Trail?

These inconsistencies have us wonder how Lössch could possibly have informed, or contributed to, GPO. Lössch's field of expertise was the economics of location and space. Earlier than his German contemporaries, Lössch must have had his own doubts as to how the war went ((i) above). Lössch had already written about how Germany's population would soon decline anyway ((ii) above). Lössch was aware of the importance of capital for modern era agricultural productivity ((iii) above). And Lössch had a thorough understanding of interregional trade.

For all its hybris with space, GPO is oddly a-spatial. Beyond setting aside those fiefs, and redefining 36 existing Polish or Soviet cities as "points of German settlement" to be spaced out every 100 km along highways or railways, GPO says virtually nothing on the allocation of people or economic activity in space.⁸

to "Germanize" them (whatever that meant; the authors were often not sure themselves) and who to expel (same). While these subsequent variations of GPO differ in detail, they do not differ in their substance, as laid out in the preceding paragraphs.

⁷This is how its authors (Konrad Meyer and, so it is suspected, Josef Umlauf, Werner Morgen, Udo von Schauroth, Angelika Sievers, Walter Christaller, and others either employed or associated with the "Reichskommissariat") later claimed its irrelevance, to play down their authorship of the plan and hence their part in the crimes the plan gave license to.

⁸The same may be said of the surviving follow-up GOP documents assembled in Madajczyk

How does any of this fit in with Lösch?

Consider the recurrent model in Lösch's „Economics of Location“ (1940). Lösch's is a modern economy of profit maximizing firms that locate, produce, mill price, compete, supply and distribute optimally, and of consumers who locate and choose rationally. Those decisions are decentralized, taken by free and mobile individuals within their usual, i.e. financial and other, constraints. In equilibrium Lösch's famous hexagonal market areas emerge. To these, capital-rich firms supply tradable products produced at scale, exploiting the advantages of fixed cost. In short, Lösch sets out a modern industrial model economy in space.

Any regional economist immediately recognizes those buzzwords of Lösch's model that would later make it into the “New Economic Geography” (Krugman (1991)): “Fixed costs” give rise to “centripetal forces”, “transport costs” counteract them “centrifugally”. The equilibrium number of firms is determined by “zero profit”, else there is “market entry”. Then “average cost” is “not minimum”, so scale economies are not exploited in full. In spite of “geography being featureless” and population spread out, a spatial hierarchy *emerges*. So this either is Lösch (1940, ch. 9), or it goes back even further (Chamberlin (1933)).

And none of this remotely resembles the dark world of GPO. There SS decisions are centralized; industries, entrepreneurship and prices are virtually inexistent; labor is almost immobile. Germanic farmers are entrusted with a fief, but then also suspected of packing in again (so that “fief-courts” were needed, too). Ultimately this is no surprise. Who would want to be a farmer-fief controlled by the SS – or much worse, a laborer-serf controlled by a farmer-fief controlled by the SS? If one could subtract the uniquely murderous context, one would be reminded of Domar (1970)'s famous explanation of serfdom and immobility in Czarist Russia. In short, GPO's sheer bleak- and evilness are breathtaking.

A linear classifier (or related machine learning) approach could be trained on documents of which authorship is known. As the various terms quoted in the previous paragraphs illustrate, no doubt such an approach would clearly separate Lösch's German from Nazi terminology. But these previous paragraphs should also illustrate how, apart from and more important than their linguistics, underlying ideas dramatically differ. Irrespective of whether we focus on linguistics or ideas, nothing in the “Generalplan Ost” sounds or looks like Lösch.

But then neither Lösch's views are in GPO, nor are his results. By implication, Lösch played no role in producing GPO. Lösch did not contribute to a “post-genocidal future”. We also rule out that Lösch may have informed GPO inadvertently. Such an inadvertent contribution would also – yet again fails to – stare back at us in terms of its terminology and/or ideas. Lösch did not contribute to any “ultra-rational concepts” that motivated “those who organized and executed the evictions, enslavements, and killings” (Take (2023, 27)).

To be sure, it is possible that Lösch left no trace in GPO not so much because he did not try to make an input but because he failed to make an input. In

(1994), except for adding a trivial rudimentary “urban system” of cities of variable sizes. – We note that “Lösch” is never listed in Madajczyk (1994)'s registry of the names of those authoring, or appearing in, GPO-related documents identified by him.

this scenario Lössch would have presented his ideas, yet also would have failed to appeal, to GPO’s authors. Now this seems *very* implausible, given the vast gulf that separates any input Lössch could have wanted to offer from the type of input Meyer was looking for. Did Lössch even know about GPO? But briefly suppose that he did. Lössch would surely be diminished. But even then this note’s central observation (of Lössch not contributing to GPO) would still hold.

For all their correspondence and Lössch’s citing Christaller (Take (2019, 2023)), Christaller could have been Lössch’s link to GPO planners. Yet Lössch’s ideas also fail to make any noticeable impact on Christaller. E.g., when Christaller (1944) recycles his ideas on central places in Nazi planning jargon, he never once appeals to any of Lössch’s economic terminology or ideas. No idea trail shows, not even from Lössch to Christaller.

As a research strategy, looking out for an idea trail should not just reject that idea trail if there is none; also it should identify an idea trail *if there is one*. Again consider Christaller. Christaller actually was a subordinate of Konrad Meyer. From 1940 up to 1945, he was present in the “Reichskommissar” offices in Berlin. We should expect Christaller’s ideas to have left their mark on GPO. And so they have. GPO (on p. 34) conspicuously uses *Hauptdorf* (i.e. “central village” or even “central hamlet”). Christaller often uses *Hauptdorf*, in texts on central place theory that are single-authored by him (e.g. Christaller (1944)). Yet no one else ever does (except for when referencing Christaller, that is). To any German speaker, *Hauptdorf* is a contrived, odd compound noun. The idea trail (from Christaller to GPO) that we expect also is the idea trail that we see.

A simple alternative to locating an “idea trail” is a citation count. We focus on the two journals favored by Nazi spatial planners, RuR and NB. Consulting the 1939 to 1944 issues of NB and the 1939-1943 and 1945 issues of RuR produces two clear and simple observations.⁹ First, Lössch never once published in any of those issues (also see Bieri (2021)). And second, Lössch is never once referenced in any of those issues’ footnotes. (While not the entire full text of those issues was searched, all footnotes were. References in those journals, at the time, were typically delegated to footnotes.) Here a large network of Nazi planners communicated their crude, often malign, ideas. But Lössch was not part of it.

4 Lössch’s Second Edition

We turn to the – very different – question of whether Nazi planning may in reverse have taken its toll on Lössch and his work. (Important as it is, this question surely is of a more limited remit. It is merely about the work and life of Lössch, rather than about decisions intent on destroying the lives of millions.) For this let us follow Lössch’s first edition of his “Economics of Location” (in 1940) through to his second edition (in 1944). The second edition adds roughly thirty pages to the first, and even a cursory comparison suggests that not all of the added text has benefited the book. (That this is so is apparent in the German original, yet interestingly seems lost on the English translation.) All of

⁹The 1944 issue of RuR was missing from Regensburg’s university library.

Lösch’s original ideas on spatial competition among free and mobile individuals and firms are still there – remarkable enough for a book printed in 1944. But one short, darker passage has found its way into the second edition, too.

At first sight, that darker passage seems to be footnote 1 on p. 92 of Lösch (1944), as first argued by Bröcker (2014) and Kegler (2015). Towards its end, this footnote addresses the Polish city of Kutno. Kutno not just was one of the many Polish cities suffering under German occupation. Kutno also was early on subjected to Christaller’s obsession with central place hierarchy. Following Take (2023, 27), “[Lösch] praise[s] a design for the area around the Polish city of Kutno” in this footnote. But on a fair reading this is not what Lösch does. Lösch (1944) merely praises *Christaller’s theory*, rather than Christaller’s design for Kutno. This we know because he does so in identical text in his first edition (Lösch (1940), pp. 87/8). In the 1940 edition Lösch writes: “Of all the contributions I know, [Christaller’s] contribution is the best . . . and at the same time an excellent example of research in economic geography”. Kutno is entirely absent from Lösch’s 1940 edition. It is only in his 1944 edition that Lösch (1944, pp. 91/2), towards the end of the initial almost two-page footnote, adds

... “[Christaller’s contribution] has visibly influenced spatial planning in the East (e.g., see B133a, p. 7, central places in Kutno)”

So Lösch cites Kutno as an example of Christaller’s theory’s *influence*, with no added praise of his own – except, but only perhaps, for inserting “visibly”.

And then Take (2023) does have a point. When referencing “B133a” above, Lösch refers to “Reichskommissar (1941)”, i.e. a document published by one of *Himmler’s* offices. It really is *another*, different, footnote further into the second edition that should be considered Lösch’s downfall (also see Kegler (2015, p. 217)). On p. 251 Lösch (1944) first asserts, in the context of the history of the US, that “. . . spatial planning can be fairly easy if agricultural land is to be settled on anew . . .”, then adds in a cryptic footnote (footnote 1) “or at least to be re-ordered, as with spatial planning for the East”. To be sure, Lösch expressly places Germany’s spatial planning “for the East” into the context of “re-ordering”, not into the fraught context of settling agricultural land “anew”.

Nonetheless: For that footnote’s one paragraph remainder then Lösch *does* approve of various publications by GPO spatial planners, or executive orders signed off by Himmler (the “Reichskommissar”) himself, as “good” or “interesting”.¹⁰ Lösch also considers, in a blanket statement, all pre-1944 volumes of the highly dubious RuR and NB to be “rich”. Lösch knew that these journals and their contents were the very opposite of “rich”.¹¹ None of those journals’ contributions openly advertise genocide either, even as they often express condescension towards Germany’s neighbors. These articles/documents often enough

¹⁰These are: Reichskommissar (1941, p. 7), Reichskommissar (1942, 68-73 and 13/II), Umlauf (1942), Meyer (1941) (with contributions by, again, Meyer’s subordinates at the “Reichskommissariat” and likely co-authors of GPO Walter Christaller, Herbert Morgen, Josef Umlauf, among others) and Reichsarbeitsstelle für Raumforschung (1941).

¹¹Consider the malicious plans laid out in RuR as early as 1941 by Greifelt (1941) and Wiepking-Jürgensmann (1941), as two examples among many.

throw up seemingly innocuous guidelines on traffic control, zoning, parking, urban design, landscaping, hedge rows, green spaces, playgrounds, etc. Many of these guidelines are even reminiscent of urban and regional planning today. But a subset of those documents or articles do betray themselves to those versed in “the language of the Third Reich” (Klemperer (2006)), or when making those conspicuously low population projections.

So if Lössch himself did not advise Nazi spatial planning (Section 3), then surely the second edition of his book did? It may be worthwhile to make two observations here. (i) Nazi planning machinery would collapse in August 1944, i.e. within months of Lössch’s second edition. Lössch’s second edition, with its tainted footnote, came too late to make a difference. (ii) But this first point pales against the larger context here. In 1944 Nazi Germany was no longer the run-off-the-mill totalitarian-aggressive country it had been in 1940. In the four intermittent years, Nazi Germany had turned into something far more sinister, i.e. an “Empire of Destruction” (Kay (2023)). Lössch’s added footnote text – submerged in 380 pages of economic theory – could simply not have escalated further the unimaginable destruction of life that had begun three years before.

Lössch’s downfall needs to be addressed. But let us briefly also reverse the vantage point once. Lössch not only analyzes spatial competition and trade in a decentralized economy with private ownership of resources. He also often, and in many different, ways rephrases the virtues of the free society. Not only are his prices flexible, and his households free where to move. Also, cooperation between nations is beneficial when among equals (rather than by relying on “slavery” and “expropriation”); voluntary intra-industry trade allows for welfare gains of nations; and not least, “equilibrium is reconcilable with freedom” ... None of these ideas, if only remotely, fitted 1944 Nazi ideology. (They contradicted it).

5 Conclusions

Rather than consult the biographical evidence, this note consults the textual evidence. It inspects “Generalplan Ost” (Meyer (1942)), and a subset of preserved documents tied to it, for evidence on whether Lössch could have informed, or was involved in, it, and finds none. None of Lössch’s vocabulary or ideas spring up in those planning documents. Lössch had no role in Nazi spatial planning. *A fortiori* he had no role in instigating, or accelerating, genocide. – But Nazi spatial planning got a role in Lössch’s second edition. A sweeping reference to the war time volumes of two central Nazi planning journals, added in a footnote in his second edition, compromise both his second edition – and Lössch himself.

Lössch added this reference because he wanted the second, 1944, edition of his book. But why taint his accomplished 1940 edition? Lössch points to his first edition being out of print. But beneath this introduction, he adds: „The author is prepared to, after the war, accept a professorship or a well-paid teaching job ... “. So now the ‘post-war Lössch’ would be willing to apply for the professorship the ‘Lössch before or during the war’ had consistently avoided applying for. This only made sense if by ‘after the war’ Lössch alluded to Nazi Germany’s defeat

– a perilous allusion in late 1944, when many people were executed for less (drawing a grafitto, telling a joke, tuning in to BBC). To be sure, this is not to bring back the myth of Lösch the resistant.¹² Instead it may motivate why, more than anything else, Lösch’s 1944 edition may have been a shout for life.

Take (2019, 2023) deserves great credit for his biographical insights, for contributing to the interest in Lösch’s life – and not least, for contributing to learning about Germany’s Nazi past, through the lens of Lösch’s life. Much can be learnt from Lösch’s correspondence¹³, and from reading about the gradual degradation of the circle of those he corresponded with or talked to. Lösch in the late 1930s corresponded with the likes of Schumpeter and Leontief, on spatial economic theory. In 1944 Lösch corresponded with Nazis such as Hermann Muhs or even Otto Ohlendorf, on his second edition (Muhs) or commissions for the Kiel institute (Ohlendorf).¹⁴ A textual approach offers another avenue towards assessing this correspondence’s two-way effect, beyond its mere fact. That approach rejects an effect of Lösch’s work on Nazi planning. But it also identifies a small, if significant and revealing, effect of Nazi planning on Lösch’s work.

Besides the textual (this note) and the biographical approach (Take (2023)), a simple cross-sectional perspective could provide yet another perspective. Very much unlike Lösch, a large number of Germany’s academics rushed to publicly declare their subservience to Hitler in 1934, then fell in line and never once dissented for the remainder of the “Third Reich”. They did so on their own accord, without ever having been asked, let alone forced, to. Following Hitler’s rise to power, thousands of young academics joined the Nazi party, then advanced into the professorships that miraculously opened up after 1934. (Nazi Germany had just shunned almost all of its Jewish, and many of its dissident, professors.) For all of Lösch’s shortcomings, one cannot help to think about the obvious counterfactual – of if only all these opportunists had been more like August Lösch.

6 Literature

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¹²... recently resurrected by Bieri (2025), who attests Lösch “unshakable intellectual integrity”.

¹³Bieri (2021)’s online archive provides online access to a single pdf with Lösch’s correspondence archived in Heidenheim, Kiel and elsewhere.

¹⁴Ohlendorf was executed in 1951 for his role as SS-„Einsatzgruppen-Leiter“. To be sure, Lösch corresponded with Ohlendorf because Ohlendorf by then had also morphed into undersecretary of the Reich’s ministry of economics (Fremdling (2016)).

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