This file was created by the TYPO3 extension publications --- Timezone: CEST Creation date: 2026-05-28 Creation time: 00:04:10 --- Number of references 15 book 2009 978-3-540-87739-4 Springer

Berlin

https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9618 Wolfgang Buchholz Friedrich Breyer We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a transparent geometric representation. Moreover, it can handle the more general concept of the cost share or ratio equilibrium. Finally, we indicate how it may be exploited to facilitate comparative static analysis of Lindahl and cost share equilibria. article 2008 11 10.1007/s00712-008-0024-0 Journal of Economics 95 SPRINGER WIEN

WIEN

167-177 2 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9610 Wolfgang Buchholz Richard Cornes Wolfgang Peters We show how optimal saving in a two-period model is affected when prudence and risk aversion of the underlying utility function change. Increasing prudence alone will induce higher savings only if, for certain combinations of the interest rate and the pure time discount rate, there is distributional neutrality between the two periods. Otherwise, changes of risk aversion that affect the distribution between the periods must also be taken into account. monograph 2008 10 2438 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9617 Wolfgang Buchholz Christian J. Bauer Applying a willingness-to-pay approach known from contingent valuation in environmental economics, we develop an ordinally based measure for the size of individual sacrifice that is connected with an agent's contribution to a public good. We construct a selection mechanism that picks the unique efficient solution among all allocations that have an equal sacrifice as defined in this way. We show that the solution thus obtained corresponds to Moulin's egalitarian equivalent allocation, conforms to both the ability-to-pay and the benefit principles, and has much in common with the Lindahl equilibrium. article 2008 8 10.1007/s10797-008-9073-0 International Tax and Public Finance 15 Springer 415-429 4 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9612 Wolfgang Buchholz Wolfgang Peters In this paper, we reconsider the debate on Weitzman's (1998) suggestion to discount the longrun future at the lowest possible rate, referring to Gollier (2004) and Hepburn & Groom (2007). We show that, while Weitzman's use of the present value approach may indeed seem questionable, its outcome, i.e. a discount rate that is declining over time, is nevertheless reasonable, since it can be justified by assuming a plausible degree of risk aversion. monograph 2008 7 2357 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9616 Wolfgang Buchholz Jan Schumacher Based on the Ramsey equation and an ethically motivated rejection of pure utility time discount, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change concentrates on the use of the elasticity of marginal utility η in the intergenerational social welfare function. We support this position by showing that, also from the view point of sustainability, application of η is preferable to the use of the pure time discount parameter ρ when a balanced distribution of utility across generations is to be brought about. After reviewing empirical studies on the size of η we develop a novel axiomatic approach based on non-envy criteria by which we obtain values for η lying in a range between 1 and 2. Whereas the starting point of the Stern Review quite explicitly is an ethical one, many critics of the Review deny this ethical stance and thus--as described in our paper--miss a crucial element of the Stern Review. monograph 2008 2 2230 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9613 Wolfgang Buchholz Jan Schumacher The motivation for the Lindahl equilibrium is mostly a rather artificial price mechanism. Even though the analogy to a competitive market was emphasised by Lindahl himself, his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas behind his concept. In the present paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some simple equity axioms. These normative assumptions are the benefit principle on the one hand and the equal sacrifice principle (or, equivalently, a non-envy condition) as a postulate for distributional equity on the other. Fairness among agents with different preferences and incomes is taken into account by considering their marginal willingness to pay as shadow prices. In this way, the reason why the Lindahl solution can be perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation might become more understandable. article 2007 10 0048-5829,1573-7101 10.1007/s11127-007-9184-7 Public Choice 133 SPRINGER

DORDRECHT

157-169 1-2 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5125 Wolfgang Buchholz Wolfgang Peters In the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model of capital accumulation and resource depletion we show the following equivalence: if an efficient path has constant (gross and net of population growth) savings rates, then population growth must be quasi-arithmetic and the path is a maximin or a classical utilitarian optimum. Conversely, if a path is optimal according to maximin or classical utilitarianism (with constant elasticity of marginal utility) under quasi-arithmetic population growth, then the (gross and net of population growth) savings rates converge asymptotically to constants. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. article 2007 3 0095-0696,1096-0449 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.09.001 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53 ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE

SAN DIEGO

213-229 2 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5130 Geir B. Asheim Wolfgang Buchholz John M. Hartwick Tapan Mitra In a standard exhaustible resource model, it is known that if, along a competitive path, investment in the augmentable capital good equals the rents on the exhaustible resource (known as Hartwick's rule), then the path is equitable in the sense that the consumption level is constant over time. In this paper, we show the converse of this result: if a competitive path is equitable, then it must satisfy Hartwick's rule. article 2005 9 0347-0520,1467-9442 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00422.x The Scandinavian Journal Of Economics 107 WILEY

HOBOKEN

547-561 3 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5144 Wolfgang Buchholz Swapan Dasgupta Tapan Mitra A framework is developed for analyzing national income accounting using a revealed welfare approach that is sufficiently general to cover, both the standard discounted utilitarian and maximin criteria as special cases. We show that the basic welfare properties of comprehensive national income accounting, previously ascribed only to the discounted utilitarian case, extend to this more general framework. In particular, under a wider range of circumstances, it holds that real NNP growth (or, equivalently, a positive value of net investments) indicates welfare improvement. We illustrate the applicability of our approach in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of capital accumulation and resource depletion. article 2005 3 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00362.x The Scandinavian Journal Of Economics 106 BLACKWELL PUBL LTD

OXFORD

361-384 2 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5370 Wolfgang Buchholz Geir B. Asheim This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of "global" pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non-cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining. article 2005 3 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00401.x The Scandinavian Journal Of Economics 107 BLACKWELL PUBL LTD

OXFORD

175-195 1 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5145 Wolfgang Buchholz Alexander Haupt Wolfgang Peters Both the economic theory of federalism and international environmental economics are interested in finding conditions under which countries or groups of countries would like to start cooperation with other countries. In the framework of the standard public-good model this paper presents a criterion for individually rational and thus voluntary international cooperation aiming at the provision of an international public good. This basic criterion can be traced back to Wicksell and Rawls and reflects the idea of reciprocity. In a further step, it is used to specify determinants that affect the decision of a group of countries to enter a coalition. It turns out that in this context the adjustment behavior of the original coalition members as well as that of the remaining outsiders is of particular importance. Finally the theoretical considerations are confronted with actual behavior of countries and groups of countries (as the EU, US and the developing countries) in the Kyoto process leading to a discussion of further prospects for global climate-change policy. article 2005 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2005.00276.x Kyklos: International Review Of Social Sciences 58 WILEY-BLACKWELL

MALDEN

25-44 1 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5143 Wolfgang Buchholz Wolfgang Peters We shed light on the Hartwick rule for capital accumulation and resource depletion by providing semantic clarifications and investigating the implications and relevance of this rule. We extend earlier results by establishing that the Hartwick rule does not indicate sustainability and does not require substitutability between man-made and natural capital. We use a new class of simple counterexamples (i) to obtain the novel finding that a negative value of net investments need not entail that utility is unsustainable, and (ii) to point out deficiencies in the literature. article 2003 10.1023/A:1023909217989 Environmental and Resource Economics 25 KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL

DORDRECHT

129-150 2 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5382 Geir B. Asheim Wolfgang Buchholz Cees Withagen Discounting future utilities is often justified by the ethically motivated objective of protecting earlier generations from the excessive saving that seems to be implied by undiscounted utilitarianism in productive economies. We question this justification of discounting by showing that undiscounted utilitarianism has sufficient malleability within important classes of technologies: any efficient and non-decreasing allocation can be the unique optimum according to an undiscounted utilitarian criterion for some choice of utility function. article 2003 10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00290 Economica 70 BLACKWELL PUBL LTD

OXFORD

405-422 279 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5381 Geir B. Asheim Wolfgang Buchholz monograph 1990 Regensburger Diskussionsbeiträge zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 225 https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/4431 Wolfgang Buchholz Wolfgang Wiegard