Lehre

2 hour lecture + 2 hour tutorial; 6 ECTS; course language: English.
For details, please refer to G.R.I.P.S.

Behavioural Economics is a branch of economics that seeks to explain many of the departures of decision-makers from what would be predicted by standard economic theory. If you have ever paid for a gym membership and never gone, if you buy a lottery ticket but also buy insurance, if you have donated blood, drunk too much alcohol or given in to temptation your decision is not explainable by the standard theory. Behavioural economics makes use of knowledge from psychology to make sense of and construct alternative models of individual decisions.

The course has three main objectives. Firstly, to reinforce students' knowledge of the core models of decision making used in economics. The second objective of the course is to make students aware of a broad range of departures from the ''rational'' behaviour assumed by models in Economics and introduce them to the most popular alternative models from Behavioural Economics that are used to explain them. The third objective is to give students sufficient knowledge so that they can recognise departures from rational behaviour in their own decisions and those of others so that they can make better decisions in future.

References:

• Angner, E. (2012). A Course in Behavioral Economics. Palgrave Macmillan
• Cartwright, E. (2011). Behavioral Economics. Routledge

Details siehe G.R.I.P.S.

Die Vorlesung schließt an die Veranstaltung „Mikroökonomie I“ des Wintersemesters an und ist Teil der mikroökonomischen Grundausbildung im Bachelor-Studium. Wir beschäftigen uns mit der Theorie individueller Entscheidungen (Konsum, Arbeitsangebot, Sparen, Risiko), Fragen der Gleichgewichtstheorie (Wohlfahrtssätze, Adverse Selektion, Handel) und der Theorie der Firma (Produktions- und Kostentheorie, Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehungen, Grenzen der Firma).

Summary: This course is taught in German. The lecture builds on "Mikroökonomie I", which is taught in the winter term. The course introduces students to the important concepts of microeconomic theory. We focus on individual decision-making (e.g., consumption and savings, labor supply, decision-making under risk), the welfare properties of markets, and the theory of the firm (production theory, principal-agent theory).

Primäre Literatur:

Die Wissenschaftssprache in der Volkswirtschaftslehre ist Englisch. Je früher man sich dieser Realität stellt, desto besser. Deshalb empfehle ich dringend, auf die englischen Originalausgaben der Lehrbücher zurückzugreifen (von denen es aber auch deutsche Übersetzungen gibt).

• Pindyck, R. S. und D. L. Rubinfeld (2008): Microeconomics, 7th ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ.
• Varian, H. R. (2007): Intermediate Microeconomics, 7th ed., W. W. Norton, New York u.a.

Eine intuitive Einführung in die Mikroökonomik (mit einem Augenzwinkern):

• Klein, G. und Y. Bauman (2010): The Cartoon Introduction to Economics, Vol. One: Microeconomics, Macmillan.

Details siehe G.R.I.P.S.

Optimale Entscheidungen sind in der Regel strategisch, d. h. sie hängen davon ab, wie die anderen Akteure sich verhalten. Dies gilt für Unternehmen, die miteinander im Wettbewerb stehen, Bieter in Auktionen, Verhandlungspartner, Kollegen, die sich um eine Beförderung bemühen, Politiker, die um ihre Wiederwahl kämpfen, aber auch für Poker-, Schach- oder Fußballspieler, um nur einige Beispiele zu nennen.

Diese Vorlesung liefert eine Einführung in die Spieltheorie, mit deren Hilfe derartige interdependente Entscheidungsprobleme analysiert werden können. Welche theoretischen Vorhersagen lassen sich für verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen machen (und inwieweit halten diese einer empirischen Überprüfung stand) – dies wird in der Vorlesung eine wichtige Frage sein. Darüber hinaus geht es darum, Sicherheit in der Anwendung spieltheoretischer Analysemethoden zu entwickeln, die in vielen Bereichen der modernen Wirtschaftswissenschaften eine große Rolle spielen.

Summary: This course is taught in German. Many real-world decisions are strategic in the sense that the optimal course of action depends on the behavior of others. For example, this holds for firms competing with each other, bidders in auctions, parties in negotiations, employees competing for promotions, politicians in electoral competition, or players in games like poker, chess, or soccer. The present lecture provides an introduction to game theory in order to be able to analyze such interdependent decision-making. Students will learn how to formulate a strategic interaction as a game. Students will be introduced to various solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Literatur:

• Gibbons, R. (1992): Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.
• Osborne, M. (2003): An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Details siehe G.R.I.P.S.

The goal of this course is to give you a thorough introduction to the field of organizational economics. For this purpose, we will discuss recent theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers contributing to the field.

By the end of the course, when you come across an empirical observation or an informal argument about organizations, you should be able to sketch a model trying to make sense of it or to develop an idea to test a conjecture.

The course is organized around the following topics:

1. Introduction: Do Incentives Work? A Primer on Incentive Theory. A Primer on Evidence from the Lab and the Field.
2. Behavioral Contracting
3. Matching of Workers to Firms
4. Persistent Productivity Differences –What Do Managers Do?
5. Learning about Organizations through Field Experiments
6. Authority and Leadership
7. Organizational Economics of the Public Sector

2 hour lecture + 2 hour tutorial; 6 ECTS; course language: English.
For details, please refer to G.R.I.P.S.

"Industrial Organization is concerned with the workings of markets and industries, in particular the way firms compete with each other." (Cabral, 2000). This course provides an introduction to Industrial Organization (IO). In particular, we will focus on firms' strategies in environments of imperfect competition (rather than monopoly or perfect competition). We will explore issues such as pricing, product positioning, market entry, capacity choice, advertising, and research and development (R&D).

Most of the material covered can be found in well-known textbooks such as Shy (1996), Cabral (2000), Motta (2004), or Bester (2010). For more advanced textbooks at the graduate and post-graduate levels, see e.g., Tirole (1988), and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). Finally, Gibbons (1992), Watson (2002), and Holler and Illing (2003) are recommended as introductory texts on Game Theory, which is an important analytical tool in Industrial Organization.

References:

• Belleflamme, P., and M. Peitz (2010): Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Bester, H. (2010): Theorie der Industrieökonomik. Springer, Berlin.
• Cabral, L. (2000): Introduction to Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
• Gibbons, R. (1992): A Primer in Game Theory. Harvester-Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
• Holler, M., and G. Illing (2003): Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Springer, Berlin.
• Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Shy, O. (1996): Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
• Tirole, J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
• Watson, J. (2002): Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. WW Norton.

Details siehe G.R.I.P.S.

Die Vorlesung ist eine der drei Pflichtveranstaltungen zu den „Methoden der VWL“ zu Beginn des Master-Studiums. Zu Beginn des Semesters findet zunächst ein über alle drei Pflichtveranstaltungen koordinierter, zweiwöchiger Mathematik-Vorkurs statt, in dem mathematische und wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretische Kenntnisse eingeübt werden, die ein wesentliches methodisches Rüstzeug für die Pflichtkurse bilden.

In der „Fortgeschrittenen Mikroökonomik“ werden daran anschließend auf Master-Niveau die Spieltheorie und die Anreiztheorie sowie ausgewählte Aspekte der Verhaltensökonomik eingeführt, die mikroökonomische Analysen auf fortgeschrittenem Niveau ermöglichen und in einer Vielzahl aktueller Forschungsarbeiten Anwendung finden.

Literatur:

• Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2005): Contract Theory. MIT Press.
• Camerer, C. F. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press.
• Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991): Game Theory, MIT Press.
• Jehle, A. J. and P. J. Reny (2011): Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Prentice Hall.
• Kreps, D. M. (1990): A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.
• Laffont, J. J. and D. Martimort (2009): The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Problem, Princeton University Press.
• MasColell, A., M. D. Whinston and J. R. Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
• Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.
• Plott, C. R., and V. L. Smith (2008): The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, North Holland Press.
• Roth, A. E., and J. H. Kagel (1997): The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Tadelis, S. (2013): Game Theory: Introduction, Princeton University Press.