Lehre

Details siehe GRIPS.

Die Vorlesung schließt an die Veranstaltung „Mikroökonomie I“ des Wintersemesters an und ist Teil der mikroökonomischen Grundausbildung im Bachelor-Studium. Wir beschäftigen uns mit der Theorie individueller Entscheidungen (Konsum, Arbeitsangebot, Sparen, Risiko), Fragen der Gleichgewichtstheorie (Wohlfahrtssätze, Adverse Selektion, Handel) und der Theorie der Firma (Produktions- und Kostentheorie, Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehungen, Grenzen der Firma).

Summary: This course is taught in German. The lecture builds on "Mikroökonomie I", which is taught in the winter term. The course introduces students to the important concepts of microeconomic theory. We focus on individual decision-making (e.g., consumption and savings, labor supply, decision-making under risk), the welfare properties of markets, and the theory of the firm (production theory, principal-agent theory).

Primäre Literatur:

Die Wissenschaftssprache in der Volkswirtschaftslehre ist Englisch. Je früher man sich dieser Realität stellt, desto besser. Deshalb empfehle ich dringend, auf die englischen Originalausgaben der Lehrbücher zurückzugreifen (von denen es aber auch deutsche Übersetzungen gibt).

• Pindyck, R. S. und D. L. Rubinfeld (2008): Microeconomics, 7th ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ.
• Varian, H. R. (2007): Intermediate Microeconomics, 7th ed., W. W. Norton, New York u.a.

Eine intuitive Einführung in die Mikroökonomik (mit einem Augenzwinkern):

• Klein, G. und Y. Bauman (2010): The Cartoon Introduction to Economics, Vol. One: Microeconomics, Macmillan.

Details see the online-learning plattform GRIPS.​​​

IMPORTANT: Starting in the summer term 2022, this course is taught in English.

Summary: Many real-world decisions are strategic in the sense that the optimal course of action depends on the behavior of others. For example, this holds for firms competing with each other, bidders in auctions, parties in negotiations, employees competing for promotions, politicians in electoral competition, or players in games like poker, chess, or soccer. The present lecture provides an introduction to game theory in order to be able to analyze such interdependent decision-making. Students will learn how to formulate a strategic interaction as a game. Students will be introduced to various solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Literatur:

• Gibbons, R. (1992): Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.
• Osborne, M. (2003): An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Details siehe GRIPS.

The goal of this course is to give you a thorough introduction to the field of organizational economics. For this purpose, we will discuss recent theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers contributing to the field.

2 hour lecture + 2 hour tutorial; 6 ECTS; course language: English.
For details, please refer to GRIPS.

"Industrial Organization is concerned with the workings of markets and industries, in particular the way firms compete with each other." (Cabral, 2000). This course provides an introduction to Industrial Organization (IO). In particular, we will focus on firms' strategies in environments of imperfect competition (rather than monopoly or perfect competition). We will explore issues such as pricing, product positioning, market entry, capacity choice, advertising, and research and development (R&D).

Most of the material covered can be found in well-known textbooks such as Shy (1996), Cabral (2000), Motta (2004), or Bester (2010). For more advanced textbooks at the graduate and post-graduate levels, see e.g., Tirole (1988), and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). Finally, Gibbons (1992), Watson (2002), and Holler and Illing (2003) are recommended as introductory texts on Game Theory, which is an important analytical tool in Industrial Organization.

References:

• Belleflamme, P., and M. Peitz (2010): Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Bester, H. (2010): Theorie der Industrieökonomik. Springer, Berlin.
• Cabral, L. (2000): Introduction to Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
• Gibbons, R. (1992): A Primer in Game Theory. Harvester-Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
• Holler, M., and G. Illing (2003): Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Springer, Berlin.
• Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Shy, O. (1996): Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
• Tirole, J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
• Watson, J. (2002): Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. WW Norton.

More information can be found on GRIPS.

Advanced Microeconomics is one of the three compulsory courses in the first semester of the master program. The course gives a rigorous introduction to the fundamental concepts and models of microeconomic theory. It consists of two parts.

The first part on Mathematical Methods of Microeconomics is part of the two-week math boot camp at the beginning of the semester that is jointly taught by the instructors of the three compulsory courses. This part introduces students to mathematical methods that are essential for the analysis of microeconomic models, and we will review a number of central concepts. Students are expected to present solutions to exercises in class.

The second part of the course introduces students to central concepts of game theory, incentives and contract theory, and behavioral economics. These tools play a major role in modern microeconomics. Again, students will be expected to present solutions to exercises in class.

Literature:

• Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2005): Contract Theory. MIT Press.
• Camerer, C. F. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press.
• Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991): Game Theory, MIT Press.
• Jehle, A. J. and P. J. Reny (2011): Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Prentice Hall.
• Kreps, D. M. (1990): A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.
• Laffont, J. J. and D. Martimort (2009): The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Problem, Princeton University Press.
• MasColell, A., M. D. Whinston and J. R. Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
• Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.
• Plott, C. R., and V. L. Smith (2008): The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, North Holland Press.
• Roth, A. E., and J. H. Kagel (1997): The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Tadelis, S. (2013): Game Theory: Introduction, Princeton University Press.